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DENIAL OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO BUILDING INSPECTION
REPORTS IN ILLINOIS: WHEN IS A PUBLIC
RECORD NOT PUBLIC?
Lopez v. Fitzgerald
76 Ill. 2d 107, 390 N.E.2d 835 (1979)
The public's right to know what goes on in government has been a
recurring theme in the history of American democracy in part, perhaps,
because of the importance to democratic theory of individual participa-
tion in governmental decisions. James Madison described the relation-
ship between the public's right of access to information and a
democratic society in the following terms: "A popular government
without popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a pro-
logue to a farce or tragedy .... [Tihe right of freely examining public
characters and measures and of free communication thereof, is the only
effectual guardian of every other right. .. ."
Another characteristic of American government has been the con-
tinuing expansion of the size and power of its institutions. Countless
governmental bodies--departments, commissions, boards, bureaus,
and agencies-have been created on the federal, state, and municipal
levels, and each of these bureaucracies creates and collects enormous
quantities of records and documents. Paralleling this growth in the
quantity of records kept has been an increase in public demand for
access to the information contained in those records.2
The basis of this demand, and of judicial support for it, has been
two-fold. One aspect is the monitoring function of public access which
serves to keep a check on official corruption and ineptitude as well as to
influence the electorate in the exercise of its political control over gov-
ernment.3 The second is the concept of a "public trust" which is
grounded in the theory that a public official or body acts on behalf of
the people and merely holds the information in government records in
trust for the public. As beneficiaries of this trust, the public should be
free to inspect those records absent some overriding governmental in-
1. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, August 4, 1822, quoted inH. CROss, THE
PEOPLE'S RIGHT To KNOW 129 (1965).
2. One indication of this public demand is the fact that at least forty-four state legislatures
have enacted statutes granting access to public records. See Brown, The Right to Inspect Public
Records in Ohio, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 518, 520-21 n.18 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Brown].
3. Id. at 519.
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terest against inspection.4
This recognized public right of access to governmental records,
however, has never been considered absolute. Limited restrictions and
exceptions to the right have been recognized, varying with the times
and circumstances under which the right has been asserted. 5 Where no
legislation has addressed the question, courts have often had to weigh
the common law right and interest of the inquiring public against the
limited need for governmental secrecy and the right to privacy where a
person is the subject of government record-keeping. 6 Where state legis-
latures have made statutory provision for public access to public
records,7 it has been the task of the courts to interpret the applicability
of such statutes to the particular records being sought.
In Lopez v. Fitzgerald,8 tenants and community organizations
sought to force the Chicago Department of Buildings9 to permit the
public to inspect and photocopy reports of building code inspections. 10
Plaintiffs-appellants' asserted right to disclosure was based upon both a
4. Id. at 518.
5. For example, courts in both England and the United States have recognized a common
law right to inspect public records. See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57
N.E. 535 (1900); New York ex rel. Henry v. Cornell, 47 Barb. 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866); 24 AM. &
ENG. ENCY. OF LAW RECORDS 182 (1903). However, in England there was some dispute whether
there was a broad general right of inspection or whether this right was limited to those who pos-
sessed a special or direct private interest to be served by inspection, as well as whether inspection
was limited to those records or parts of records that affected that interest. See Stewart, The Right
to Examine Public Records, 37 CENT. L.J. 395 (1893).
In America, most of the early cases that contained any discussion of the common law right to
inspect either concluded that the general rule in England did not require a direct private interest
or rejected this restriction as not binding upon the courts of this country. In these cases, the
controversy generally concerned the issue of which persons possessed the right to inspect a public
record, rather than whether a particular record was in fact a public record and thereby subject to
inspection. See generally Wells v. Lewis, 12 Ohio Dec. 170 (Super. Ct. 1901).
6. As the appellate court noted in Illinois ex rel Better Broadcasting Council, Inc. v. Keane,
17 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 309 N.E.2d 362 (1973):
The people's right to know . . . must be balanced by the practical necessities of
governing. Public officials must be able to gather a maximum of information and dis-
charge their official duties without infringing on rights of privacy. . . . Therefore, it is
important to consider whether disclosure would constitute an invasion of privacy;
whether there could be prejudice to private rights or give an unfair competitive advan-
tage;. . . whether it would discourage frankness; and whether it could cut off sources of
information upon which a government relies.
Id. at 1092-93, 309 N.E.2d at 364, cited by the majority in Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 Ill. 2d 107, 120,
390 N.E.2d 835, 840 (1979).
7. Forty-four states have statutes granting access to public records. For full citations of
those statutes, see Brown supra note 2.
For a discussion of the problems encountered in defining what constitutes a "public record,"
see Note, Iowa's Freedom of Information Act: Everything You'Ye Always Wanted to Know About
Public Records But Were Afraid to Ask, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1163 (1972).
8. 76 Ill. 2d 107, 390 N.E.2d 835 (1979).
9. Hereinafter occasionally referred to as the building department.
10. Hereinafter occasionally referred to as building inspection reports or inspection reports.
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common law right of access to public documents" l and a previously
uninterpreted disclosure provision of the Illinois Local Records Act.'
2
The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that the reports at issue
were in fact "public records" as defined by the statute 3 but held by a
narrow four to three margin that the disclosure provision of the Act
provided an "insufficient basis" for allowing access to such records.' 4
The court further found that any common law or public interest which
favored disclosure was outweighed by concern for the due process and
privacy rights of landlords 5 and the possibility that release of such in-
formation might impair the efficiency of government.'
6
This case comment will first review the background of statutory
and common law access to public records against which the Lopez ap-
pellants asserted their right to disclosure of the building inspection re-
ports in question. It will examine the majority and dissenting opinions
in Lopez and the considerations upon which the court declined both
bases of appellants' claim. Finally, this case comment will critically
analyze the reasoning advanced by the majority. It will suggest that, in
reaching its decision, the Lopez majority applied contrived theories of
statutory construction to avoid the clear language and intent of the Illi-
nois legislature in statutorily providing for disclosure. It will further
show that the Lopez court not only disregarded the common law tradi-
tion, democratic history, and public policy favoring access to public
records, but also stretched privacy and due process protections beyond
any previously recognized scope in its efforts to shield the reputations
and profits of Illinois landlords.
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS
TO PUBLIC RECORDS
Prior to Lopez, the Illinois Supreme Court had never addressed
the citizen's right to view and copy governmental records under either
the common law or the Illinois Local Records Act. Although certain
analogous decisions of the high court had strongly favored disclosure, '7
11. 76 111. 2d at 113, 390 N.E.2d at 837.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, §§ 343.101-343.114 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
13. 76 Ill. 2d at 117, 390 N.E.2d at 839.
14. Id. at 116-17, 390 N.E.2d at 838.
15. Id. at 121-22, 390 N.E.2d at 841.
16. id. at 119, 390 N.E.2d at 840.
17. Weinstein v. Rosenbloom, 59 Ill. 2d 475, 322 N.E.2d 20 (1974) (industrial commission
must disclose insurance information to employees); Buettel v. Walker, 59 Ill. 2d 146, 319 N.E.2d
502 (1974) (governor's executive order requiring disclosure of campaign contributions by entities
doing business with the state does not violate right of privacy); Illinois State Employees Ass'n v.
Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974) (requirement that state employees file financial disclo-
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the basic right of Illinois citizens asserted in Lopez had previously been
considered only by Illinois appellate courts.' 8 Thus, as briefs of amici
curiae in Lopez reflect, 19 the fundamental interest 20 of citizens and
community organizations in examining reports or records dealing with
the condition and safety of dwellings was of even wider public concern.
Illinois appellate case law appears to support this concern for pub-
lic access to records which are kept by government according to law or
which have been the subject of some governmental action. In uphold-
ing the right of citizens to both inspect and reproduce school board
financial records, the court in Illinois ex rel Gibson v. Peller2' ex-
plained: "There exists at common law the right to reproduce. . . pub-
lic records as an incident to the common law right to inspect and use
public records. Good public policy requires liberality in the right to
examine public records. ' 22 Finding preliminary title reports in the
hands of a school board to fall within the definition of public records as
set forth by the Illinois Local Records Act, the court in Illinois ex rel
Hamer v. Board of Education23 ordered disclosure of those records
"[ujnder the applicable statutes . . . and the general desirability of a
policy which permits the public inspection of documents acted upon by
public officials in a public capacity .... -24
Under the same definition, the court in Illinois ex ret Better Broad-
casting v. Keane25 held that private financial reports submitted to city
government by franchise applicants were not "public records" under
the Illinois Local Records Act or at common law.2 6 In so holding, the
court distinguished records kept by government pursuant to law or in
discharge of a legal duty from business records of a private character
which are in the custody of city officials.2 7
A survey of high court decisions from other states on the rights of
sure did not violate right of privacy); Illinois v. Dime Savings Bank, 350 Ill. 503, 183 N.E. 604
(1932) (written records of public tax officer's transactions must be kept as a public record).
18. See text accompanying notes 21-27 infra.
19. Brief and Reply Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants of Amiri League
of Women Voters of Illinois, League of Women Voters of Chicago, NAACP, Chicago-Southside
Branch, Chicago Council of Lawyers, Chicago Urban League, Business and Professional People
for the Public Interest, and the Better Government Association, Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 Il. 2d 107,
390 N.E.2d 835 (1979).
20. See, e.g., Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
21. 34 Ill. App. 2d 372, 181 N.E.2d 376 (1962); see Rektenwald v. Janura, 59 Ill. App. 3d 143,
376 N.E.2d 22 (1978).
22. 34 Ill. App. 2d at 374, 181 N.E.2d at 378.
23. 130 Ill. App. 2d 592, 264 N.E.2d 420 (1970).
24. Id. at 595-96, 264 N.E.2d at 423.
25. 17 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 309 N.E.2d 362 (1973).
26. Id. at 1093-94, 309 N.E.2d at 364.
27. Id. at 1094-95, 309 N.E.2d at 366.
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public access to government records both at common law and under
statutory access provisions reveals a strong presumption among the
courts in favor of public access and against unduly restrictive limita-
tions on disclosure. In upholding the common law right of citizens to
gain access to public records, the Michigan Supreme Court over fifty
years ago explained:
Ours is a government of the people. Every citizen rules. . . .There
is no question as to the common law right of the people at large to
inspect public documents and records. The right is based on the in-
terest which citizens necessarily have in the matter of which the
records relate.
28
Most recently, the Ohio Supreme Court in Dayton Newspapers,
Inc. v. City of Dayton29 set forth the generally accepted standard when
it allowed citizen access to city jail log records:
The rule in Ohio is that public records are the people's records, and
that the officials in whose custody they happen to be are merely trust-
ees for the people; therefore anyone may inspect such records at any
time, subject only to the limitation that such inspection does not en-
danger safety of the record, or unreasonably interfere with the dis-
charge of the duties of the officer having custody of the same.
30
Other state supreme court decisions approving of broad public ac-
cess include a Kentucky decision upholding the common law right to
inspect building, tax, and financial records of a city government;3' an
Oregon acknowledgement of a statutory right of access to studies of
radiation hazards by the state health department and rejection of a
common law "preliminary records" exception to that right;32 an Arkan-
sas decision maintaining a common law right of access to the financial
records of the state treasurer;33 and a similar decision by the West Vir-
ginia high court upholding a common law right of access to the state
treasurer's records of deposits of state monies. 34 Numerous other state
courts have ordered the release of reports, similar to the type of report
sought in Lopez, which detailed the results of inspections by agencies
concerned with health and safety.
35
28. Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928).
29. 45 Ohio St. 2d 107, 341 N.E.2d 576 (1976).
30. Id. at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 577-78, quoting Ohio v. Ayers, 171 Ohio St. 369, 372, 171
N.E.2d 508, 510 (1960).
31. City of St. Mathews v. Voice of St. Mathews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1974).
32. MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961).
33. Republic Party of Arkansas v. Arkansas, 240 Ark. 545, 548, 400 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1966).
34. West Virginia ex rel. Charleston Mail Ass'n v. Kelley, 149 W.Va. 766, 143 S.E.2d 136
(1965).
35. See, e.g., Citizens for Better Care v. Reizen, 51 Mich. App. 454, 215 N.W.2d 576 (1974)
(health department evaluation reports of nursing homes); Young v. Town of Huntington, 388
N.Y.S.2d 978, 88 Misc. 2d 632 (1976); Martinez v. Libous, 378 N.Y.S.2d 917, 85 Misc. 2d 186
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Federal courts also have upheld the common law "right to know"
or freedom of information on the basis of its important interrelation-
ship with the freedoms of expression and petitioning for redress of
grievance. 36 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit noted as recently as 1976 the interrelationship be-
tween the first amendment and this "precious common law right...
that predates the Constitution itself."
37
In discussing the judicial history of upholding access to public
records, the court in United States v. Mitchell noted that no sound rea-
son could be advanced for depriving a citizen of his right to view such
records, "for it is evident that the exercise thereof. . . will serve as a
check upon dishonest public officials, and will in many respects con-
duce to the betterment of the public service." 38 It is important to note,
however, that neither the common law right nor express statutory pro-
visions for disclosure have been totally free of restriction. Where it has
been shown that a "compelling public interest" 39 would be served by
secrecy, most courts have adopted a balancing test in weighing that se-
crecy interest against the presumption in favor of public access. As a
result of that strict standard, restrictions and exceptions to the policy
favoring disclosure have been granted only in very limited circum-
stances.
40
(1975) (building department housing code inspection report); Application of Dwyer, 378 N.Y.S.2d
894, 85 Misc. 2d 104 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1972) (fire investigation report); Alberghini v. Tizers,
328 N.Y.S.2d 272, 68 Misc. 2d 587 (1972) (sanitary inspection report by health department); Provi-
dence Journal Co. v. Shea, 292 A.2d 856 (R.I. 1972) (health department water pollution inspection
report).
The state health department in Providence Journal contended, like the Lopez majority, that
water pollution inspection reports could not be released until after a hearing. Unlike the defend-
ants herein, however, the health department could assert an explicit statutory requirement that no
finding of violation be made before a hearing was granted. Nevertheless, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court found the health department's claim without merit, ruling it was not the intent of
the legislature that all such reports be withheld pending a hearing. Once the health department
had completed an inspection and filed its reports, whether or not violations were found, the re-
ports then became "open to the public." 292 A.2d at 859.
36. H. CROSS, THE PEOPLES' RIGHT TO KNOW xiv (1953); Emerson, Legal Foundations ofthe
Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14-20.
37. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 435 U.S.
589 (1978).
38. 551 F.2d at 1258, quoting Indiana ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 625, 57 N.E.
535, 538 (1900).
39. See text accompanying notes 130-37 infra.
40. See Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (recognition of privacy interest limit-
ing the power of government to disseminate unresolved arrest records); Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp., 508 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1974) (protection of investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes); Texas Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1964) (recogni-
tion of need for confidentiality where employee registers labor complaint against employer). See
also the Federal Freedom of Information Act which exempts from disclosure investigatory law
enforcement records where disclosure would interfere with enforcement proceedings, deprive a
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LopEZ v. FITZGERALD
Statement of the Case
The plaintiffs in Lopez were tenants and neighborhood organiza-
tions in Chicago who had at various times asked the Chicago Depart-
ment of Buildings to make available records of housing code
inspections of buildings in which they resided or planned to reside and
of buildings in the neighborhoods which the community organizations
were working to preserve. Karen Lopez wanted to know if violations
of the Chicago Building Code4 1 were found in her apartment after in-
spections had been made pursuant to her complaint to building depart-
ment officials. 42  Susan Gonzalez anticipated renting a building for
commercial purposes and therefore wanted to be sure that the property
conformed to the code before she signed a lease.43 Central Lakeview
Neighbors Association sought to find out why a neighborhood build-
ing, supposedly in compliance, continued to have fires.44
These three plaintiffs and others had asked to see the records of
code inspection for specified buildings in Chicago. Each had been de-
nied access to those records because of a blanket policy of the building
department which denied such access to non-owners. 45 The tenants
and organizations sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to
their alleged citizens' right of access to public records at common law
and under the Illinois Local Records Act. 46 The Circuit Court of Cook
County held that the inspection records were public records and en-
person of a right to a fair trial, or constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. 5 U.S.C. § 552
(b)(7)(A), (B), (C) (1976).
41. The Municipal Code of Chicago [hereinafter referred to occasionally as the municipal
code] provides that it is the duty of the Illinois Commissioner of Buildings to cause an investiga-
tion to be made of all complaints filed with the Illinois Department of Buildings and to keep a
record of such investigations on file together with the reports and findings signed by the inspector
or inspectors. MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS § 41-6 (1977).
Those city ordinances referred to by the court and this comment as the "building code" or
"code" are scattered throughout the Municipal Code of Chicago under descriptive topic headings.




45. Id. See afro Brief of Defendants-Respondents at 8-9, 11-16, Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 Ill.
2d 107, 390 N.E.2d 835 (1979).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, §§ 43.101-43.114 (1977). Those provisions of the Illinois Local
Records Act which are relevant to the issues discussed in Lopez are set forth below:
LOCAL RECORDS ACT
AN ACT in relation to the destruction and preservation of public records of courts,
counties, municipal corporations and political subdivisions of the State of Illinois,
making an appropriation in connection therewith, and to repeal an Act herein named.
Approved Aug. 13, 1961. L.1961, p. 3503.
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tered a permanent injunction directing their disclosure. 47
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District reversed, hold-
ing that there is no right to obtain disclosure of inspection records, at
least until "final" reports have been filed, under either the Illinois Local
Records Act or the Municipal Code of Chicago.4 8 The court recog-
nized a limited common law duty to disclose, but held that it did not
encompass "preliminary" reports.49 On rehearing, the court clarified
that the plaintiffs did have a right of access to final reports under the
Illinois Local Records Act, but "not until a final report, or final action
had been taken."
50
The issue on appeal before the Illinois Supreme Court, then, was
whether records, which are otherwise public records at common law
5'
and under Illinois statute5 2 and the Municipal Code of Chicago,5 3 may
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:
43.101 Short title.] § 1. This Act shall be known and may be cited as "The Local
Records Act".
43.102 Legislative declaration.] § 2. This Act declares that a program for the effi-
cient and economical management of local records will promote economy and efficiency
in the day-by-day recordkeeping activities of local governments and will facilitate and
expedite governmental operations.
43.103 Definitions.] § 3. Except where the context indicates otherwise, the terms
used in this Act are defined as follows: ...
"Public record" means any book, paper, map, photograph, or other official docu-
mentary material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made, produced, exe-
cuted or received by any agency or officer pursuant to law or in connection with the
transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by such
agency or officer, or any successor thereof, as evidence of the organization, function,
policies, decisions, procedures, or other activities thereof, or because of the informational
data contained therein. . .As amended by act approved Aug. 24, 1965. L.1965, p. 3692.
43.103a Local government unit-School district-Records of obligation, receipt and
use of funds as public records.] § 3a. Reports and records of the obligation, receipt and
use of public funds of the units of local government and school districts are public
records available for inspection by the public. These records shall be kept at the official
place of business of each unit of local government and school district or at a designated
place of business of the unit or district. These records shall be available for public in-
spection during regular office hours except when in immediate use by persons exercising
official duties which require the use of those records. The person in charge of such
records may require a notice in writing to be submitted 24 hours prior to inspection and
may require that such notice specify which records are to be inspected. Nothing in this
section shall require units of local government and school districts to invade or assist in
the invasion of any person's right to privacy. Added by P.A. 77-1869 § I eff. Oct. 1, 1972.
43.113 Copies of record-Fees.] § 13. In any case where public records have been
reproduced by photography, microphotography or other reproduction on film, in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Act, any person or organization shall be supplied with
copies of such photographs, microphotographs, or other reproductions on film upon pay-
ment of the required fee to the officer having custody thereof. The fee required to be
paid shall be the actual cost of such copies, plus a service charge of 15% of such cost.
47. Lopez v. Fitzgerald, No. 76-336 (Circuit Court of Cook County, February 10, 1976).
48. 53 Ill. App. 3d 164, 165, 368 N.E.2d 357, 358 (1977).
49. Id. at 168, 368 N.E.2d at 359.
50. Id.
51. See text accompanying notes 17-40 supra.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.103 (1977).
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be withheld from disclosure under a judicially created "preliminary
records exception" to that right of access.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, but
not on the basis of the preliminary records exception.54 The majority
found that while the Municipal Code of Chicago provided that build-
ing inspection reports would be "preserved as public records"55 it did
not contemplate disclosure of those records to the public.5 6 The court
further concluded that, despite the presence of a general provision in
the Local Records Act that "any person or organization shall be sup-
plied with copies . . .-57 of public records, the location of that provi-
sion toward the end of the Act indicated an "insufficient basis .. to
justify access by plaintiffs. .. .
Finally, the court found that, while common law and public policy
favored public access to public records, in this instance that right was
outweighed by "countervailing factors" 59-specifically, the possibility
that a landlord's privacy and due process rights might be violated by
disclosure of investigatory reports before notice and an opportunity to
be heard60 and the potential that public disclosure of investigation re-
sults might "impair the efficiency" of the department of buildings.61
The majority concluded that investigative reports should not be re-
leased to the public unless and until the owner has had notice and an
opportunity to be heard. The court added that, once a public document
becomes part of a court record, then rules governing access to such
records control.
62
53. MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS §§ 41-6, 41-7 (1978).
54. The court explained: "[Blecause oftechnical, definitional problems raised in determining
whether a particular record is a 'preliminary' record, we do not base our conclusion that the
investigative reports at issue here are not open to public access on the preliminary records excep-
tion." 76 I11. 2d at 123, 390 N.E.2d at 841.
55. MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS § 41-7 (1978).
56. 76 Ill. 2d at 118, 390 N.E.2d at 839.
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 116, § 43.113 (1977).
58. 76 Ill. 2d at 116, 390 N.E.2d at 838.
59. Id. at 118, 390 N.E.2d at 839.
60. Id. at 119, 390 N.E.2d at 840.
61. Id. at 122, 390 N.E.2d at 841.
62. Id. These guidelines were somewhat clarified in the court's supplemental opinion upon
denial of rehearing, 76 Ill. 2d at 130-32, 390 N.E.2d at 844-46, where, in professing to reiterate its
initial holding, the majority stated that "once a notice of violation has been sent to a building
owner and he has been given an opportunity to respond at a compliance hearing, building inspec-
tion reports. . . may be open to public access." Id at 130, 390 N.E.2d at 845 (emphasis added).
In its supplemental opinion, the court also took judicial notice of the following statutory
authority not cited by the parties earlier: "When the building code department of a municipality...
determines a building code violation exists it shall cause a notice of such violation to be posted in a
conspicuous place near the main entrance of such building." Id. at 131, 390 N.E.2d at 845, quot-
ing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/, § 3402 (1977) (emphasis supplied by court). The Lopez court inter-
preted the prerequisite determination of an "existing violation" to mean a finding following a
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Reasoning of the Majority
A Statutory Interpretation
The reports to which the plaintiff in Lopez sought access were
compiled pursuant to provisions of the Municipal Code of Chicago.
63
The court determined that while the code provides that building in-
spection reports "shaH be preserved as public records and shall be ad-
mitted in the trial of the cause as prima facie evidence" of code
violation,64 the code's lack of a specific provision for public disclosure
of investigation reports indicated that such disclosure was not in-
tended. 65 The majority reasoned that the term "public record" as used
in the Municipal Code of Chicago was directed to a circumstance other
than public access to records.
66
Most critical to the outcome, however, was the court's analysis of
section 13 of the Illinois Local Records Act.67 In examining the statu-
tory language, context, and purpose of the Act, the court acknowledged
that building inspection reports fall within the definition of "public
records" as used in the Act.68 In further examining the Act's language,
the court also recognized that, "[als originally enacted and currently in
force, the Act contained a general provision that any person shall be
supplied 69 with copies of public records reproduced in accordance with
provisions of the Act."7 °
Despite the admittedly clear wording of the Act, the majority
found several other factors which militated against interpreting the
statute according to its language. Focusing first upon the Act's "pur-
pose," the majority interpreted the title and legislative declaration 7' to
indicate that the legislature's primary concern had been to determine
which local government records should be preserved on film. 72 The
court did not find disclosure to be foreign to the purpose of the Act, but
focused upon the title's indication that preservation was the Act's pri-
mary purpose. 73 Based upon that, the court concluded that "[blecause
notice to the building owner and an opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the court held the
statute to be inapplicable until such notice and hearing. 76 Ill. 2d at 131, 390 N.E.2d at 845.
63. See note 41 supra.
64. Id.
65. 76 Ill. 2d at 114, 390 N.E.2d at 837.
66. Id. at 118, 390 N.E.2d at 839.
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.113 (1977).
68. See note 46 supra.
69. Id.
70. 76 Ill. 2d at 115, 390 N.E.2d at 838.
71. See note 46 supra for specific language of the enabling clause and title.
72. 76 Ill. 2d at 116, 390 N.E.2d at 838.
73. See note 46 supra.
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the [Act] is concerned with the preservation of records, a cursory provi-
sion. . . found toward the end of the Act cannot be construed to estab-
lish a basis for disclosure of specific records preserved.
'74
Looking next at the statute's context, the court placed considerable
weight upon the fact that, despite the general disclosure provision con-
tained in section 13 of the Illinois Local Records Act, the Act was
amended in 1972 to include an express provision that local government
financial records are public records available for inspection.75 Al-
though the majority noted that this amendment had been necessary to
bring the Act into conformity with a recent amendment to the Illinois
Constitution,76 it took the express disclosure provision of section 3a to
indicate that section 13 could not have been intended as a general ac-
cess statute:77 "Were section 13 a general access statute, the amend-
ment would have been superfluous, and this court will not assume the
legislature engaged in a useless act.
' '78
Finally, looking to other jurisdictions, the majority reasoned that,
because many general access statutes in other jurisdictions contained
limitations and restrictions which the Illinois statute did not, the lack of
such limitations upon the right of access in section 13 therefore indi-
cated that the legislature had not been addressing disclosure ques-
tions.
79
The Common Law Right of Access
Finding the statutory basis for disclosure to be insufficient, the
court turned to the question of whether inspection reports are public
records available to the public at common law. Recognizing a series of
cases in support of a general public policy favoring open government,
80
the court nevertheless found that "countervailing factors" indicated
nondisclosure in the case of building inspection reports.
81
The majority began its reasoning with the balancing test set forth
74. 76 Ill. 2d at 116, 390 N.E.2d at 838.
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, § 43.103a (1977).
76. ILL. CONST. art. 8, § l(c) (1970).
77. 76 Ill. 2d at 116, 390 N.E.2d at 838.
78. Id. at 117, 390 N.E.2d at 838, citing Pinkstaffv. Pennsylvania R.R., 31 Ill. 2d 518, 524,
202 N.E.2d 512, 515 (1964).
79. 76 I11. 2d at 117, 390 N.E.2d at 834. The court cites disclosure statutes from other states
which expressly exempt law enforcement investigative reports: CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254 (West
1978 Supp.); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 3(i) (1978 Supp.); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26(f)
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1978 Supp.). See 76 Iil. 2d at 117, 120, 390 N.E.2d at 839, 840.
80. Weinstein v. Rosenbloom, 59 I11. 2d 475, 482, 322 N.E.2d 20, 24 (1974); Illinois ex rel.
Gibson v. Peller, 34 I11. App. 2d 372, 374, 181 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1962); Nowak v. Auditor General,
243 Mich. 200, 203, 219 N.W. 749, 750 (1928).
81. 76 Ill. 2d at 118, 390 N.E.2d at 839.
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by the Oregon Supreme Court in MacEwan v. Holm,82 where it was
suggested that the interest of citizens in knowing what the government
is doing and their proprietary interest in public property should be
weighed against the interest of the public in having the business of gov-
ernment carried on efficiently and without undue interference. 83 The
Lopez court reasoned that in determining whether building investiga-
tion reports should be accessible, additional elements must be included
in the equation and concluded that in the instant case "[clonsiderations
of privacy and due process militate against public access to initial in-
vestigation reports without notice to the building owner and without an
opportunity for him to respond.
'84
The Constitutional Dimension
In support of its finding of a privacy interest in landlords, the court
cited the United States Supreme Court opinion in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc.,85 which recognized an employer's fourth amendment privacy
right against warrantless intrusions by government safety inspectors.
While recognizing that the context was distinguishable, the majority
reasoned that the recognition of privacy interests by the Supreme Court
in that context indicates the existence of privacy considerations which
weigh against disclosure of initial investigation reports concerning
rental properties.
86
The court went on to cite a 1973 Illinois appellate decision for the
proposition that the people's right to know must be balanced by the
practical necessities of governing.87 The court noted the importance of
considering such factors as whether disclosure would constitute an in-
vasion of privacy; whether it could result in prejudice to private rights
or give an unfair competitive advantage; and whether it might discour-
age frankness and thereby possibly cut off sources of information relied
upon by the government.88 The majority did not discuss how these
considerations might apply to the Lopez facts. The court nevertheless
summarized its reasoning regarding the privacy factor by simply noting
that the public good is not served by disclosures which undermine the
82. 226 Or. 27, 44-45, 359 P.2d 413, 420-21 (1961).
83. Id.
84. 76 Ill. 2d at 119, 390 N.E.2d at 840.
85. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
86. 76 Ill. 2d at 120, 390 N.E.2d at 840.
87. Illinois ex rel. Better Broadcasting Council, Inc. v. Keane, 17 I11. App. 3d 1090, 1092-93,
309 N.E.2d 362, 364 (1973).
88. 76 Ill. 2d at 120, 390 N.E.2d at 840, quoting Illinois ex rel. Better Broadcasting Council,
Inc. v. Keane, 17 I11. App. 3d 1090, 1092-93, 309 N.E.2d 362, 364 (1973).
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sense of security for individual rights89 and concluded that the policy
favoring disclosure must yield when justice requires.90
In support of its finding that due process rights would be
threatened by disclosure of inspection reports prior to notice and hear-
ing, the Lopez court cited the United States Supreme Court explana-
tion in Paul v. Davis9' of an earlier due process decision, Wisconsin v.
Constantineau.92 Noting the Paul Court's holding that due process
rights are triggered only where governmental action actually deprives
one of a right under law,93 the Lopez majority reasoned that:
The public release of initial investigation reports indicating building
code violations, without notice and a hearing, threatens the property
owner's ability and right to lease his property, and otherwise reap
financial benefit from his property, thus calling for due process safe-
guards under both the Federal and Illinois constitutions.
94
Similarly, in a supplemental opinion denying a rehearing,95 the
majority applied the same reasoning in interpreting additional author-
ity cited by plaintiffs in their motion for rehearing and supplemental
brief. The additional statute cited provides that "when the building
code department of a municipality. . . determines a building code vio-
lation exists it shall cause a notice of such violation to be posted in a
conspicuous place near the main entrance of such building. '96 The
court found the phrase "determines a . . violation exists" to mean a
finding following a notice to the owner and an opportunity to be
heard.97 The majority reasoned that such a reading of the statute takes
into account the landlord's "due process rights and effects the principle
of statutory construction which mandates that, where reasonable, stat-
utes will be construed to avoid an unconstitutional result.
' '9s
Reasoning of the Dissent
Three members of the court dissented on both common law and
89. 76 Ill. 2d at 120, 390 N.E.2d at 840, citing Craemer v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d
216, 222, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193, 199 (1968).
90. 76 Ill. 2d at 120, 390 N.E.2d at 840, citing United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1260
(D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
91. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
92. 408 U.S. 433 (1971). For a discussion of the facts and reasoning set forth by the Supreme
Court, see text accompanying notes 143-59 infra.
93. 424 U.S. at 708.
94. 76 I11. 2d at 121, 390 N.E.2d at 841.
95. 1d. at 130-32, 390 N.E.2d at 845-46 (supplemental opinion upon denial of rehearing).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l2, § 3402 (1977). See also note 62 supra.
97. 76 I11. 2d at 131, 390 N.E.2d at 845.
98. Id. at 132, 390 N.E.2d at 845, citing Anderson v. Schneider, 67 I11. 2d 165, 176, 365
N.E.2d 900, 904 (1977).
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statutory grounds.99 Writing in dissent, Justice Clark acknowledged
the privacy risk that disclosure of government records could pose when
intimate details of citizens' lives are exposed as a result, but he argued
that the importance of an informed citizenry demands, even absent a
statutory mandate, that the maximum amount of public access be pro-
vided which would be consistent with citizens' legitimate expectation of
privacy.'o Referring to the majority's treatment of appellant's Illinois
Local Records Act claim, the dissent added that: "Where there is an
express statutory mandate, we ought not to subvert its intent through
unduly restrictive construction of its unambiguous and constitutionally
sound language."'' 1
ANALYSIS OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT OPINION
The case of Lopez v. Fitzgerald0 2 presented the Illinois Supreme
Court with issues of broad public importance affecting both the critical
role of citizens in effective housing code enforcement and the funda-
mental right of public access to public records.
In order to negate both the statutory and common law bases as-
serted for public access to inspection records, the Lopez court applied
strained theories of statutory construction and created new ones to con-
travene the clear and unambiguous language of the Illinois legislature.
More unsettling, however, is the court's misreading of Paul v. Davis'
0 3
to support a holding which totally contradicts the principles set forth in
that United States Supreme Court decision. As the following analysis
will show, while purporting to apply a balancing test, the Lopez major-
ity has in fact created previously unrecognized due process protections
for the profits and reputations of noncomplying landlords while disre-
garding the common law and public policy favoring public access to
government records and citizen participation in housing code enforce-
ment.
The Illinois Local Records Act
The majority opinion did not dispute the fact that the reports at
issue fell within the section 3 definition of public records, that these
records had been reproduced on microfilm, and that section 13 clearly
provides that, as microfilmed public records, they "shall be supplied"
99. Justice Clark's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Goldenhersh and Justice Moran.
100. 76 Ill. 2d at 124, 390 N.E.2d at 842 (Clark, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. 76 Ill. 2d 107, 390 N.E.2d 835 (1979).
103. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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to the public upon payment of the proper fee. Nevertheless, as Justice
Clark pointed out in his dissent,'°4 the Lopez majority effectively held
that the words "shall be supplied" really mean shall not be supplied
unless the public "is otherwise entitled to access" to them.
0 5
The majority explained that, in reaching its conclusion, "we have
examined the statutory language and its context, as well as statutory
purpose." 0 6 An analysis of the court's reasoning reveals, however, that
the majority disregarded an express statutory directive and defeated the
intent of the statute through an unnecessarily restrictive and less than
logical construction of its clear, sound language.
Despite the court's explanation of its approach to interpretation,
its opinion paid no attention to the plain language of the statute in
question. Nowhere in its analysis did the majority discuss the strong
presumption that the legislature meant precisely what it said. t0 7 The
court instead focused entirely upon context and its perception of statu-
tory purpose to develop a three-part rationale for disregarding the. leg-
islature's intent that public records "shall be supplied" to the public. 
0 8
When the legislature has set aside an entire section of the Act for
the purpose of providing for access to documents, it is difficult to un-
derstand how the Lopez court found such a provision to be "cursory."
This is particularly so in light of the court's assertion that it would "not
assume the legislature engaged in a useless act."'1 9 Neither is it clear
what role the physical location of the provision within the Act should
logically play in determining whether the legislature really intended
what it provided. As Justice Clark observed in his dissenting opinion:
"The legislature need not use exclamation points and exhaustive state-
104. 76 I11. 2d at 123-29, 390 N.E.2d at 842-44. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
105. Id. at 127, 390 N.E.2d at 843 (Clark, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 116, 390 N.E.2d at 838.
107. See, e.g., Illinois Telephone Ass'n v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 67 Ill. 2d 15, 20-21, 364
N.E.2d 63, 64-65 (1977); Bovinette v. City of Mascoutah, 55 111. 2d 129, 133, 302 N.E.2d 313, 316
(1973); Droste v. Kerner, 34 I11. 2d 495, 503, 217 N.E.2d 73, 78 (1966) cert. denied and appeal
dismissed, 385 U.S. 456 (1967), citedin 76 Ill. 2d at 127, 390 N.E.2d at 843 (Clark, J., dissenting).
See also text accompanying note 65 supra and notes 129-31 infra.
108. The reasoning of the Lopez majority may be summarized as follows: First, because "the
[Act] is concerned with the preservation of records, a cursoryprovision referring to public access to
preserved records found toward the end of the Act cannot be construed to establish a basis for
disclosure of specific records preserved." 76 I11. 2d at 116, 390 N.E.2d at 838 (emphasis added).
Second, because the legislature found it necessary to amend the Act by adding section 3a to pro-
vide expressly for public inspection of certain financial records, section 13 must be presumed not
to have previously provided for public access to any records. "[T]his court will not assume the
legislature engaged in a useless act." Id. at 117, 390 N.E.2d at 838. Finally, because section 3a of
the Act and disclosure statutes from other jurisdictions contain some limitations on disclosure and
"section 13 ... contains no limitations at all on the asserted right of access, [it is] an indication
that the General Assembly was not addressing disclosure questions." Id., 390 N.E.2d at 839.
109. Id., 390 N.E.2d at 838.
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ments of legislative purpose to make its will known. I find the phrase
'any person or organization shall be supplied with copies' more than
adequate." 10
Furthermore, the court's finding that the express provisions for
disclosure of financial records in section 3aII preclude the possibility
that section 13 also provides for access disregards both the legislative
history of the Illinois constitution and the wording of section 3 a." 2 As
originally enacted in 1961, the Illinois Local Records Act only provided
for access to records which had been reproduced on microfilm or by
other means. Section 3a was passed to conform to the requirements of
article 8, section l(c) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution" 13 that local
government financial records be made available to the public whether
or not such records fall within the "public records" definition of the
Illinois Local Records Act or have been reproduced photographically.
In passing on article 8, section 1(c) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the
Revenue and Finance Committee of the Illinois Constitutional Con-
vention indicated that it expected the general assembly to pass legisla-
tion enforcing the right of the public to see the financial records of
government, but added:
Many requirements . . . of this sort are presently found in the
statutes of the state. The committee does not intend that words such
as those it uses here would replace those statutes but rather would
place a firm foundation beneath them and guarantee the public its
right to have access to such material." 14
Finally, as Justice Clark pointed out in the dissent, while it would
have been commendable for the legislature to have included guidance
on what internal limitations should have been applied to section 13, its
failure to do so hardly seems to be a sound basis for ignoring the unam-
biguous language of the Act." 5
With the exception of the weight placed by the court upon the lo-
cation of the disclosure provision within the Act," 6 all other factors
110. Id. at 128, 390 N.E.2d at 844 (Clark, J., dissenting), citing the language of ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 116, § 43.113 (1975).
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, §43.103a (1977).
112. See note 46 supra.
113. ILL. CONST. art. 8, § l(c) (1970).
114. Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, Vol. II at 872.
115. In his dissent, Justice Clark pointed out that:
[Tihe absence of internal limitations upon the right of access created by section 13 is no
excuse for ignoring the unambiguous language of the statute. That such limitations
would have been salutary does not render the statute unconstitutional in their absence,
as applied to the facts of this case. . . . I therefore cannot concur in the court's eviscer-
ation of the plain language of section 13.
76 Ill. 2d at 128, 390 N.E.2d at 844 (Clark, J., dissenting).
116. "[A] cursory pro vision referring to public access to preserved recordsfound toward the end
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applied are valid considerations when a court must interpret an ambig-
uous statute. A court may be called upon to (1) decide which of two or
more coordinate rules to apply; or (2) determine what the lawmaker
intended to prescribe by a given rule; or (3) meet deficiencies or ex-
cesses in rules imperfectly conceived or enacted.1 7 As Roscoe Pound
recognized: "The first two are cases for genuine interpretation. The
third case, when treated as a matter of interpretation, calls for spurious
interpretation." t 8 When attempting to derive from the language of a
statute "the same idea which the author intended to convey,"' 19 inter-
pretation is purely judicial in character; and, so long as the ordinary
means of interpretation, namely the literal meaning of the language
used and the context, are resorted to, there can be no question.
120
However, when these primary indications of the intent and meaning of
the legislature fail to lead to a result the court finds satisfactory and
recourse is taken to outside indicators which change or distort rather
than clarify the language of the statute in question, "the line between a
genuine ascertaining of the meaning of the law and the making over of
the law under guise of interpretation becomes more difficult."'
12 1
Limitations Upon the Common Law Right of Access
The Lopez majority was correct in recognizing that, despite a com-
mon law tradition of public access to public documents, 122 counter-
vailing factors may call for nondisclosure in limited circumstances. 123
The weakness in the Illinois Supreme Court's justifications for negating
the right of access, however, is that the court repeatedly cited proposi-
tions of law which are on their face indisputable but which are consist-
ently inapplicable to the issues raised in the Lopez fact situation.
Those legitimate "countervailing factors" and their application to the
realities of the Lopez case are examined below.
The Public Interest in Confidentiality and Governmental Efficiency
The Lopez court approvingly cited language from the leading case
of the Act cannot be construed to establish a basis for disclosure of specific records preserved." 76
I11. 2d at 116, 390 N.E.2d at 838 (emphasis added).
117. J. AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 1023 (3d ed. 1875).
118. Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907) [hereinafter referred to
as Pound].
119. F. LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS ch. 1, § 8 (1970).
120. Pound, supra note 118, at 381.
121. Id.
122. See text accompanying notes 17-40 supra.
123. See, e.g., note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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of MacEwan v. Holm124 in which the Oregon court recognized a broad
statutory right of access to preliminary data but added that the public
interest may in some circumstances require that information in a record
be withheld, even where the request is made for a lawful purpose. 125
Citing such instances as where citizens seek evidence in the hands of a
district attorney or minutes of a grand jury, the MacEwan court pro-
posed a balancing test whereby the general presumption in favor of
public access to public records could be overcome by a compelling pub-
lic interest in confidentiality. 126 The Lopez court, however, applied the
MacEwan balancing test to weigh the right and interest of citizens in
knowing what government is doing against "the interest of the public in
having the business of government carried on efficiently and without
undue interference."'' 27 While the court did not include in that equa-
tion the public interest in safe housing nor explain how disclosure
might interfere with or impair the efficiency of city government, the
majority concluded that the public interest in access is nevertheless out-
weighed by the court's own speculation that "[p]ublic disclosure of such
reports would. . . tend to impair the efficiency of day-to-day activities
of and investigations by the Department of Buildings."' 28
The notion of possible impairment of governmental efficiency or
department investigations was not even suggested by defendants 29 and
appears nowhere in the record. As the MacEwan court suggested, there
may well be instances where a "compelling public interest in confiden-
tiality"'' 30 exists and, in fact, should be weighed against statutory and
common law rights to disclosure of public records. But in raising, sua
sponte, a general public interest in "governmental efficiency" without
explanation and then concluding that the public right to disclosure
must yield because exercise of that right "would tend to impair" such
124. 226 Or. 27, 44-45, 359 P.2d 413, 420-21 (1961).
125. 76 Ill. 2d at 118-19, 390 N.E.2d at 839.
126. 226 Or. at 34-35, 359 P.2d at 421-22.
127. 76 Ill. 2d at 119, 390 N.E.2d at 839.
128. Id. at 122, 390 N.E.2d at 841. It is interesting to note that the building department did
and continues to make these reports available to building owners while denying them to tenant-
complainants, interested community organizations, and others. As a Michigan court observed in
similar circumstances:
Thus, the very information which defendants seek to shield from the public view is in the
possession of those persons regulated, on behalf of the public, by the defendants. Under
these circumstances, there can be no meritorious claim that the defendant agency is ei-
ther protecting the integrity of its policy-making process or seeking to prevent the prema-
ture discovery . . . of information gathered for enforcement purposes.
Citizens for Better Care v. Reizen, 51 Mich. App. 454, 215 N.w.2d 576 (1974).
129. See Brief for Defendants-Respondents, Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 I11. 2d 107, 390 N.E.2d
835 (1979).
130. 226 Or. at 34-35, 359 P.2d at 421-22.
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efficiency, the Illinois Supreme Court both misconstrued and misap-
plied the very valid balancing test to which it referred. Even if, argu-
endo, a real and serious interference in the efficiency of government
had been pleaded by defendants or even cited by the court, when the
"compelling public interest" balancing test is applied to the Lopez
facts, the strong public interest in effective code enforcement and in
knowing what government is (or is not) doing clearly outweighs any
considerations in favor of secrecy suggested by the bench.
Privacy Considerations
In the Lopez court's discussion of privacy as another element in
the equation, the majority again correctly stated accepted law and then
improperly applied that law to the Lopez fact situation in order to fur-
ther justify nondisclosure. The Lopez court began this area of discus-
sion by pointing out that both the Illinois Supreme Court in Leopold v.
Levin131 and the United States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc. 132 have recognized a right to privacy. 1
33
The Illinois court did recognize a right of privacy in Leopold, but
in fact held that when that right is involved with the publication of a
matter of public interest, it should be judicially viewed in a narrow and
cautious manner since "the objective [is] to insure 'uninhibited' discus-
sion of legitimate public issues." 134 In Barlow's, the United States
Supreme Court recognized an employer's fourth amendment right to
privacy against warrantless intrusions by government safety inspec-
tors.1 3 5 The Lopez opinion acknowledged that the Barlow's context
was "distinguishable," but maintained that the mere recognition of pri-
vacy interests in Barlow's indicated privacy considerations weighing
against disclosure in Lopez.136 However, a superficial examination of
the issues addressed in the Barlow's decision and the facts in Lopez
reveals that the Barlow's case is not merely distinguishable, but rather
totally inapplicable.
Property owners certainly do possess a significant privacy interest
against physical entries on their property. That interest is protected by
the fourth amendment, 37 but the physical entry of government inspec-
tors was not an issue in Lopez. Rather, the issue in Lopez was the right
131. 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970).
132. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
133. 76 Ill. 2d at 120, 390 N.E.2d at 840.
134. 45 Ill. 2d at 442, 259 N.E.2d at 255.
135. 436 U.S. at 311-13.
136. 76 11. 2d at 120, 390 N.E.2d at 840.
137. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
of citizens to public records resulting from entries and inspections
which had already taken place and the lawfulness of which was not
questioned. Unlike the Barlow's case, Lopez raised no fourth amend-
ment issues.
It also is unquestioned that the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the right of privacy as a distinct constitutional right protect-
ing privacy against unlawful governmental intrusion in other con-
texts. 138 This "fundamental" right of privacy, however, has been found
to exist only in areas where the Court determined that the government
had no power to regulate substantively-such as matters relating to
marriage, procreation, family relationships, and child rearing and edu-
cation. 39 That type of record was not in issue in Lopez.
The records sought by petitioners in Lopez merely related to the
physical condition of property, an area in which the government does
have the power to regulate substantively. The courts never have held
that the kind of information sought in Lopez or the form in which it
would have been disclosed-the physical condition of property as
noted in inspection reports-raises any substantial privacy concern.
4°
In reality, the privacy interests of property owners would have been
affected only slightly, if at all, by disclosure of the records sought.
While the right of privacy is a recognized constitutional and private
right, the Illinois Supreme Court has not presented a sound or convinc-
ing rationale for tipping the balance away from the legal presumption
and strong public interest in public access.
Due Process Rights
The final and most significant "element" found by the Lopez court
to tip the balance in favor of nondisclosure was the majority's original
theory that public dissemination of building inspection records before a
property owner has had notice and an opportunity to be heard would
138. While, as recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), the Constitution does not
explicitly mention any right of privacy, the United States Supreme Court has declared that the
right of privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (stating that, except in very limited cir-
cumstances, the right to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy is a
fundamental constitutional right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
139. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
140. The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that, in an area which the state may substantively
regulate (i.e., the "relation of public employer and public employee"), property ownership is not
within the protected zone of privacy under either the Illinois Constitution or the United States
Constitution. Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 524-26, 315 N.E.2d 9, 15-17
(1974) (governor's executive order mandating disclosure of financial interests of government em-
ployees and their families does not offend right of privacy).
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be a denial of due process of law.' 4 ' As a constitutional argument,
their position is both confused and incorrect since the United States
Supreme Court decisions upon which the court relied directly contra-
dict the majority holding.
Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, notice
and hearing are necessary only if the government action at issue would
deprive a citizen of a liberty or property interest protected under state
or federal law.' 42 Although the Lopez majority opinion is not clear on
this point, we must assume from the court's references to due process
that the court presumes building owners possess a liberty or property
interest of which they would be deprived by disclosure of reports
describing the physical condition of their property.
The Lopez majority cited Wisconsin v. Constantineau43 and Paul v.
Davis'44 to support their finding that a property owner has a liberty or
property interest in his right to "lease . . . and otherwise reap financial
benefit from his property"145 and that due process safeguards are neces-
sary where that interest is "threatened" by disclosure of the condition
of that property. In Constantineau, a Wisconsin statute allowed police
to post notices in liquor stores prohibiting the sale of liquor to persons
who were considered "dangerous to the community." Making refer-
ence to "badge[s] of infamy," 46 the Supreme Court held that "the right
to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss" is a princi-
ple basic to our society. 147
The Lopez court was most correct in observing that the Constan-
tineau holding was subsequently explained in Paul v. Davis and that,
according to Paul, due process rights are triggered only where govern-
141. In Alberghini v. Tizes, 328 N.Y.S.2d 272, 68 Misc. 2d 587 (1972), the court applied just
such a balancing test and required disclosure of preliminary inspection records of dwellings and
facilities in privately owned migrant labor camps. There it also was argued that the public interest
would best be served by concealing records from the public which might reveal violations of the
law. The court rejected that argument, stating:
Whether the Orange County Health Department is properly discharging its function is
an important public concern of all of the residents of Orange County. The sanitary
conditions prevailing in migrant labor camps. . . are also a major concern of all of its
citizens. The salutary effect ofmaking available to public scrutiny thepublic records sought
by petitioner outweighs any individual interest in concealment.
Id. at 275, 68 Misc. 2d at 589 (emphasis added).
142. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court stated that "to determine
whether due process requirements apply. . . we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of
the interest at stake." Id. at 570-71 (emphasis in original).
143. 408 U.S. 433 (1971).
144. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
145. 76 Ill. 2d at 121, 390 N.E.2d at 841.
146. 400 U.S. at 437.
147. Id., citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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mental action deprives an individual of a right under law. 148 However,
the Illinois court then concluded that due process safeguards are there-
fore necessary under the Lopez facts because public access to investiga-
tive reports "threatens the property owner's ability and right to lease
. ..and otherwise reap financial benefit from his property."' 149 The
direct connection required by Paul between the government's action in
disclosing such information and any actual denial of those rights was
not addressed by the Lopez court. It is submitted that this connection
was not explained by the Lopez court because the direct link between
government action and deprivation of a protected interest which is nec-
essary to invoke fourteenth amendment protections simply did not exist
in Lopez. The necessity of that connection, however, was well ex-
plained by the United States Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis and ear-
her cases.
In Paul, the plaintiff had been included on a list of "active shop-
lifters" 150 distributed to local merchants by police. Paul had only been
charged with shoplifting, had not had a hearing on those charges, and
further faced threatened loss of employment as a result of being so
listed.' 51 The Court found that these slurs on his reputation neverthe-
less did not deny him any recognized liberty or property interest. 152
Even accepting Paul's contention that such a criminal designation
would seriously impair his future employment opportunities, 53 the
Court could not find that such a "threat" to an admitted liberty interest
constituted a deprivation. 154 The Paul Court cited support for this con-
clusion in earlier Supreme Court decisions,' 5 5 including Board of Re-
gents v. Roth156 in which the Court recognized that governmental
action defaming an individual in the course of declining to rehire him
would not be actionable under the fourteenth amendment unless that
action 'foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities." 
5 7
The Paul opinion distinguished Constantineau by explaining that
the state's posting of notices which forbade liquor sales to Constan-
148. 76 11. 2d at 121, 390 N.E.2d at 841.
149. Id.
150. 424 U.S. at 695.
151. Id. at 697.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 701-02.
155. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
156. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
157. Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
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tineau violated due process not because of any special protection af-
forded reputation by the fourteenth amendment, but rather because
"the government action taken in that case deprived [her] of a right previ-
ously held under state law-the right to purchase liquor."' 58 In Con-
stantineau's case, it was not a question of whether the state had merely
interfered with or "threatened" the future exercise of a right she shared
with other citizens. The question was whether there had been an actual
foreclosure of that right by the state. Procedural safeguards were re-
quired in the Constantineau case, the Court said, because the prohibi-
tion of liquor sales to plaintiff had "significantly altered her status as a
matter of. . .law."' 59
The release of building inspection reports to tenants or other mem-
bers of the public does not alter the legal rights of Illinois property
owners to do with their property as they wish. Consistent with United
States Supreme Court case law, no governmental action in the form of
fines or orders is taken until after the requisite notice and hearing have
taken place. 60 Landlords of inspected property remain free to enter
into leases, collect rents, and advertise or otherwise offer their property
for sale or lease.' 61 Contrary to the Lopez majority's findings, even the
landlord whose property receives the most negative inspection report
retains his "right to lease. . . and otherwise reap financial benefit from
[his] property."' 62 The effect of disclosure in such a situation would
merely be to allow a prospective tenant notice of the condition of the
property he contemplated leasing.
If the actual effect of a negative inspection report were that the
owner of any given building was forced to close the building or was
legally prevented from renting or selling the property, the Lopez court's
due process concerns might be well-founded. However, the creation by
the Illinois Supreme Court of procedural due process protections
against the "threat" of soiling the reputations and thereby possibly im-
pairing the profits of noncomplying landlords simply cannot stand a
close reading of United States Supreme Court case law.
158. 424 U.S. at 708 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS §§ 41-6, 41-7 (1977).
161. While it may be true that a secondary effect of public access to this information might be
to decrease the rental or sale value of noncomplying property, the situation would be directly
analagous to that of the slandered plaintiff in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Court
acknowledged that it was probable that Paul's future employment prospects were impaired as a
result of the defamation by the government, id. at 697, but held that the due process clause does
not ex proprio vigore extend to a person the right to be free of injury wherever the state may be
characterized as the tortfeasor. Id. at 697, 699-701.
162. 76 Ill. 2d at 121, 390 N.E.2d at 841.
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The Public Policy Favoring Citizen Particpation
in Housing Code Enforcement
The Illinois Supreme Court itself has observed that "the providing
of adequate housing accommodations is a problem of first importance
and urgency for the cities," 163 and the Illinois legislature has also recog-
nized the state-wide problems of the shortage of decent, safe housing
and the deterioration and neglect of existing housing.' 64 It has been
estimated that in Chicago more than twenty-five percent of all housing
units need extensive or moderate repairs to bring them into sound con-
dition. 165
Clearly, effective housing code enforcement is the strongest
weapon which society has in fighting against further deterioration and
in forcing the upgrading of already inadequate housing. 166 An in-
formed public, particularly residents and community organizations, is
critical to effective code enforcement. As the National Commission on
Urban Problems, chaired by the late Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois,
recognized: "Failure to fully inform those affected by a housing code
program can result in lack of cooperation, with consequent substantial
delays in the program, and can throw the whole program into
doubt." 16
7
Without justifying or even addressing the dismissal of these impor-
tant considerations, the Lopez decision to shield inspection reports
from public scrutiny seriously hinders effective code enforcement in
several ways. First, private code enforcement actions are strongly dis-
couraged by the unavailability of inspection reports. Illinois statute
provides that any person residing within 1200 feet of a building which
is in violation of code is authorized to bring a private code enforcement
action.168 Without access to inspection reports, tenants cannot make an
informed decision on whether to file an enforcement suit and, if so,
163. Community Renewal Foundation v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 44 Ill. 2d 284, 291, 255
N.E.2d 908, 913 (1970).
164. See, e.g., Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 64 (1977);
Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation Law, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 252 (1977); Housing
Development Authority, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 671h, § 303 (1977).
165. HOUSING ASSISTANCE PLAN: 1977, CITY OF CHICAGO 5 (June 1977), submitted to the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development pursuant to the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5300 (1976).
166. Less effective and more costly efforts include various private and federally subsidized
rehabilitation programs, as well as private tort actions when deteriorated and unsafe conditions
result in serious injury or death to occupants.
167. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 300
(Dec. 1968).
168. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, § 11-13-15 (1977).
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what violations to allege. The unavailability of such reports also makes
it more difficult for tenants or community organizations to negotiate
with building owners for improvements that would eliminate violations
and thereby avoid the burdens of litigation.
Second, inaccessibility of investigatory reports severely diminishes
the important oversight role of tenants and community residents in
housing code enforcement. Unless a compliance hearing is held fol-
lowing complaints of code violations by tenants or neighbors and an
inspection by the building department, citizens may never know
whether and what violations were found or why and how a decision not
to force compliance was reached. 169 In light of recent strongly sup-
ported allegations regarding bribery and corruption among City of
Chicago Building Department inspectors, 170 these concerns are not un-
founded. Under the Lopez decision, the public cannot discover where
and when corruption, incompetence, or mere oversight on the part of
building inspectors may have prevented code enforcement.
Other related effects of the Lopez majority's failure to uphold pub-
lic access rights include the hindrance of community groups' efforts in
undertaking neighborhood-wide preservation.'17' The majority's ruling
prevents rapid and efficient discovery of reported violations and the use
of information contained in inspection reports in court actions, negotia-
tions, and other community improvement efforts. Finally, the market-
place incentive for improving property is greatly diminished when
prospective purchasers or lessees, such as two of the petitioners, 72 can-
not learn of code violations prior to signing a lease or contract.
Finally, the Lopez decision fails to confront the not-unheard-of
problem in Chicago of cases in which the building department, whether
for reasons of corruption or incompetence, investigates a building after
a complaint but does not issue a notice of violation or hold a compli-
ance hearing. As a result of the Lopez holding, neither tenants nor the
general public will ever know why no action was taken. If a building
inspector accepts a bribe for not reporting violations or if another de-
partment official, for whatever reason, squelches an investigation, the
Lopez decision assures that the records in such cases may go undis-
169. See, e.g., affidavits of Karen Lopez and Gloria Perez, Record, vol. I at 161-62, 168-69,
Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 I11. 2d 107, 390 N.E.2d 835 (1979).
170. See Zekman & Smith, Mirage on Tap, The Chicago Sun-Times, January 8 to February
14, 1978.
171. See, e.g., affidavit of Edward Jones, Record, vol. 1, at 155-57, Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 Ill.
2d 107, 390 N.E.2d 835 (1979).
172. Record at 158-66, Lopez v. Fitzgerald, 76 I11. 2d 107, 390 N.E.2d 835 (1979).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
closed since a compliance hearing is an absolute prerequisite to disclo-
sure. 173
As Justice Clark pointed out in his dissenting opinion, "disclosure
of Government records is a two-edged sword" and any disclosure pol-
icy should take considerations of fairness to building owners into ac-
count. 174 But fairness to owners need not overwhelm the fundamental
interest of tenants in safe housing and of the general public in efficient,
corruption-free government.
An owner's concerns about the reputation of his property can be
adequately safeguarded without denying citizens their rightful role in
code enforcement and shielding incompetence and corruption on the
part of public officials. As the dissent suggested, this could be accom-
plished by giving the owner of the property in question notice of the
disclosure sought by any individual or group and an opportunity to
supplement the record with evidence of compliance or other informa-
tion before its disclosure. 75 The defamation laws demand that any in-
dividual or group which obtains disclosure of such a supplemented
record cannot relate it without acknowledging the owner's side of the
story. 176
CONCLUSION
As this comment has shown, the Lopez decision to deny public
access to building inspection reports represents a refusal of the Illinois
Supreme Court to respect this country's long history, common law tra-
dition, and public policy favoring public access to government records.
Under the guise of applying a "balancing test," the court has stretched
privacy and due process protections beyond any previously recognized
scope, while at the same time applying contrived theories of statutory
construction to avoid the clear language and intent of the legislature in
statutorily providing for disclosure through the Illinois Local Records
Act.
The problems of creating a fair but effective method of assuring
the public's access to the information necessary to control their govern-
ment and their lives are numerous and complex, but must be met. The
Illinois Supreme Court failed to confront these problems in Lopez,
much less offer the citizens of Illinois any workable answers. In the
interest of protecting the right of Illinois landlords to "reap financial
173. 76 11. 2d at 122, 390 N.E.2d at 841.
174. Id. at 123, 390 N.E.2d at 842 (Clark, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 134, 390 N.E.2d at 847 (Clark, J., dissenting).
176. See, e.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 Il. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
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benefit," the Lopez majority denied a fundamental public right and es-
tablished a dangerous precedent for denying Illinois citizens access to
those governmental records which most directly affect their lives.
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